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VICTIM PARTICIPATION                                   
IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 
Erin Ann O’Hara* 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal law scholarship has recently turned its eye toward the 
victim—an individual obviously profoundly affected by the crime 
and its consequent legal proceedings. Nevertheless, this focus is 
unusual for modern lawyers because victims are typically ignored 
in the legal academy, where criminal law is cast essentially as a 
battle between prosecutors and defendants. In fact, a recent survey 
of eighteen criminal procedure textbooks indicated that the vast 
majority of the texts do not mention victims at all in their indexes, 
several include only a single paragraph or note on victim 
involvement in criminal trials, and only one treats victims with any 
degree of sophistication.1 These omissions reflect the realities of 
the American criminal justice system, in which victims have 
gradually been sidelined during the past century. 
Given that virtually all law professors were trained in criminal 
law classes that ignored victim involvement in the criminal justice 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Special thanks to Nancy King, 
Donald Hall, and the participants at the Brooklyn Law School panel discussion 
on Three Perspectives on Criminal Justice for helpful comments, questions, and 
insights. Thanks also to Julie Reed who has provided valuable research 
assistance. This project was generously supported by the Vanderbilt University 
Law School. 
1 Hearing on H.J. Res. 64 Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep., 106th Cong. 2d Sess. at 227 
(Feb. 10, 2000) (statement of Douglas Beloof, Professor, Northwestern School 
of Law at Lewis & Clark College) [hereinafter Hearing on H.J. Res. 64], 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/belo0210.htm. 
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process, it is perhaps not surprising that it is considered heretical to 
suggest that direct participation by victims might be warranted.2 
Indirect participation3 by victims and even the attendance of 
victims at criminal proceedings4 are likewise viewed by many as 
problematic. In the legal academy, any other state of affairs 
threatens the very foundations of justice. 
This prevailing attitude is encapsulated in a letter signed by 
450 law professors opposing the proposed federal Victims’ Rights 
Amendment.5 The amendment has been considered in Congress 
each year since 1996 and, although the specific provisions vary 
from term to term, the amendment basically would guarantee 
victims: (1) the right to attend the trials of their accused 
perpetrators; (2) the right to notice of important proceedings 
involving defendants; (3) the right to be heard at proceedings 
involving plea agreements, sentencing, and parole; (4) the right to 
confer with the prosecuting attorney prior to the disposition of their 
                                                          
2 Id. (“[T]here is immense resistance within the legal academy to the idea 
of victims becoming part of the criminal process. This is because . . . we have a 
legal culture in which all of us were taught that there are only two sides to a 
proceeding”). For examples of critiques of victim participation, see Paul H. 
Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence Over Criminal 
Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 756-57 (2002) 
(arguing against allowing victims the ability to state the punishment that they 
feel the offenders deserve); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the 
Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 514 (1994) 
(opposing any participation at trial by attorneys hired by victims). 
3 See, e.g., Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for 
Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 235 (1991) (opposing the use of victim 
impact statements at sentencing). 
4 Hearing on H.J. Res. 64, supra note 1, at 104 (statement of Judge Emmett 
G. Sullivan, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) (expressing 
disapproval of attendance at trial of victims who wish to testify at the guilt 
phase). 
5 Id. at 56. Several articles opposing the proposed amendment have 
appeared in law reviews. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson Powell, 
With Disdain for the Constitutional Craft: The Proposed Victims’ Rights 
Amendment, 78 N.C. L. REV. 371, 372-74 (2000); Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ 
Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in 
Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L. J. 1691, 1692 (1997) [hereinafter Victims’ 
Rights]; see also infra notes 15, 24. 
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cases; (5) consideration of their concerns regarding the timely 
resolution of cases; and (6) consideration of their safety prior to the 
conditioned release of offenders.6 The law professors’ letter in 
opposition to the amendment was submitted to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in 1997.7 
Several recent law review articles also are highly critical of the 
victims’ rights movement. The authors of these articles view 
revenge as distasteful, lower-class behavior, and victims’ 
preferences for involvement as unnecessary, unfair, and 
dangerous.8 For example, Elayne Rapping laments: 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Letter from Law Professors Regarding the Proposed Victims’ 
Rights Constitutional Amendment (Apr. 28, 2003) (on file with author); 2002 
Victims’ Rights Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcommittee 
on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep., 107th 
Cong. 2d Sess. (May 9, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing on H.J. Res. 91], available at 
http://commdocshouse.gov/committees/judiciary/hju79525.000/hju79525_0.htm 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005); 2000 Rights of Crime Victims’ Constitutional 
Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 64 Before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep., 106th Cong. 2d 
Sess. (Feb. 10, 2000). 
7 A handful of law professors and authors of law review articles have come 
out in support of the amendment. See, e.g., Hearing on H.J. Res. 91, supra note 
6, at 95 (May 9, 2002) (prepared statement of Roberta Roper) (quoting Professor 
Lawrence Tribe as supporting the proposed amendment); Id. at 150-56 (prepared 
statement of Professor Douglas Beloof in favor of proposed Amendment); Paul 
G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 481-82; Steven J. Twist, The Crime 
Victims’ Rights Amendment and Two Good and Perfect Things, 1999 UTAH L. 
REV. 369, 372-73. 
8 See William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture’s 
Theory of Revenge, in LAW AND THE DOMAIN OF CULTURE 161, 161-62 (Austin 
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998) (arguing that “church, state and reason 
all line up against” the legitimacy of revenge, leaving revenge with the status of 
“the ineffable vulgarity of young lower-class males”). As Miller indicates, this 
distaste for victims’ desire for revenge reflects broader social concerns with the 
concept. Susan Jacoby eloquently states the point: 
Justice is a legitimate concept in the modern code of civilized behavior. 
Vengeance is not. We prefer to avert our eyes from those who persist in 
reminding us of the wrongs they have suffered—the mother whose 
child disappeared three years ago on a New York street and who, 
instead of mourning in silence, continues to appear on television and 
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a slow but insidious trend in national consciousness and 
criminal justice policy away from the liberal policies of the 
Warren Court, with its concern for the rights of 
defendants . . . toward a far more reactionary (in the truest 
sense of the word), often even bloodthirsty, concern for the 
‘rights’ of ‘victims’ to revenge and punishment of the most 
extreme kind.9 
She warns that the “rhetoric” and “displays of grief” by victims in 
fact mask “a great deal of cold brutality.”10 “Beneath the 
compelling emotion that informs the demands of victims, there is 
all too often an ugly and irrational cry for blood that smacks of 
mob violence and vigilante justice.”11 Rachel King has written 
similar, but more measured, remarks: “giving victims 
‘constitutional rights’ is a step down a slippery slope to returning 
our criminal justice system to a time of private prosecutions when 
personal vengeance ruled the outcome of cases.”12 Paul Robinson, 
who at least thinks that victims’ rights groups should be paid some 
attention,13 nevertheless argues that “victims ought to have no 
influence [over adjudication] because an offender’s liability and 
punishment ought to depend on his blameworthiness (including, 
                                                          
appeal for information about her missing son; the young Sicilian 
woman who, instead of marrying her rapist as ancient legal custom 
dictates, scandalizes the town by bringing criminal charges; the 
concentration camp survivors who, instead of putting the past behind 
them, persist in pointing their fingers at ex-Nazis living comfortable 
lives on quiet streets. Such people are disturbers of the peace; we wish 
they would take their memories away to a church, a cemetery, a 
psychotherapist’s office and allow us to return justice and vengeance to 
the separate compartments they supposedly occupy in twentieth-
century life. 
SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 1-2 (1983). 
9 Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims’ 
Rights Movement, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 665, 665 (1999-2000). 
10 Id. at 679. 
11 Id. 
12 Rachel King, Why a Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment is a Bad 
Idea, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 359 (2000). 
13 Robinson, supra note 2, at 749 (advocating victims’ rights organizations’ 
influence over criminal law adjudication). 
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primarily, the seriousness of his offense) not on his good luck as to 
the forgiving or vindictive nature of his victim.”14 
Although opponents of victims’ rights use the term “revenge” 
rather than “retribution” to describe the victims’ goals, the 
distinction is purely rhetorical: 
[T]he relationship between ‘retribution’ and ‘revenge’ is 
analogous to the only recently obsolete substitution of 
‘protection’ for ‘birth control’: it has less to do with good 
and evil than with ambivalence about violations of social 
piety and propriety grown so widespread that they have 
become the rule rather than the exception.15 
Whether labeled as revenge or retribution, these opponents believe 
that the criminal justice process should be insulated from victims’ 
sentiments. 
This essay does not promote the Victims’ Rights Amendment16 
or advocate any other specific victims’ rights proposal.17 Rather, it 
suggests that, as a positive matter, victim involvement in the 
criminal process is becoming and will continue to be a reality of 
our criminal justice process. Too often law professors feel content 
to dogmatically insist that crimes are wrongs committed against 
                                                          
14 Id. 
15 JACOBY, supra note 8, at 4. 
16 The strengths and weaknesses of the proposed amendment are explored 
in a Hearing on H.J. Res. 91, supra note 6, and in a Hearing on H.J. Res. 64, 
supra note 1. 
17 Victims’ rights groups have proffered a number of proposals either to 
afford victims rights or to modify the criminal justice process to aid conviction 
and sentencing. Some of the proposals have been enacted into state and federal 
statutes and into state constitutional amendments. The proposals include 
victims’ rights to restitution, attendance, participation, and allocution. They also 
include the rights to consult with prosecutors, to veto plea agreements, to refuse 
defendants’ discovery requests, and to have their safety considered prior to any 
release of the offender. Other reform efforts include the elimination of the 
exclusionary rule, speedier trials, reduced bond releases, evidence rule 
modification, bans on defendant profiting from crime, and enhanced sentences 
and use of the death penalty. For a discussion of these reform efforts, see Lynn 
N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims’ Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 966–1020 
(1985); see generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(1999). 
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the public rather than an individual and that, therefore, victim 
involvement in criminal cases beyond the potential witness 
capacity is inappropriate.18 Contrary to their assertions, however, 
victims have been involved in the disposition of criminal cases for 
much longer than they have been marginalized, and they are 
unlikely to remain impotent forces in the disposition of cases. As a 
consequence, advocates must think creatively about how to 
provide victims with participation at a minimal cost to existing 
procedural protections for defendants. Part I of this essay briefly 
traces the evolution of state control over criminal prosecution. Part 
II argues that, as a matter of political economy, an unstable 
equilibrium is created by closing victims out of the criminal justice 
system. This article leaves for future discussion the identification 
of desirable victims’ rights reforms. 
I. THE MARGINALIZATION OF CRIME VICTIMS 
Victims of crime may bring tort actions against their 
perpetrators, but because many, if not most, criminals are 
essentially judgment-proof, the civil route is often considered to be 
an ineffective or insufficient means by which to provide relief to 
victims.19 Even when perpetrators are able to pay judgments, the 
civil trial can be a hollow, antiseptic, and therefore inappropriate 
forum for serving the emotional needs of the victim.20 Victims 
seek both revenge and strong social condemnation of criminals, 
and they hope to receive vindication and validation from society.21 
These needs are far more effectively served in the criminal law 
                                                          
18 See Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution: A 
Restorative Justice Critique of Antigang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 717, 751 (2000) (discussing this viewpoint); see also 
EACRET V. HOLMES, 333 P.2d 741, 742 (Or. 1958) (stating that criminal 
punishment is a matter of public policy, not private vengeance). 
19 John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing 
Victims’ Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victims’ Rights in the Courts, 33 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 689 (2002). 
20 Note, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 
1532-33 (1993) (stating that tort suits “lack the social condemnation that 
accompanies criminal sanctions”). 
21 See infra Part II. 
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setting. 
Historically, victims have had significant influence on the 
criminal process. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, victims 
throughout Europe were left without a governmental structure to 
address their suffering.22 Victims were left to rely on self help, the 
assistance of kin, and the practice of “outlawry,” whereby the 
community was considered entitled to attack and banish an 
offender from its midst.23 The victims’ desire for revenge, 
condemnation, vindication, and validation could all be satisfied 
“privately.” Eventually, however, a system of fines payable to both 
the victim and the king began to replace self-help violence, with 
victims prosecuting their own claims to restitution.24 As the legal 
system developed in England, 
[t]he lords’ consolidation of power, the greed of kings, and 
the need for a coherent system of laws transformed 
criminal law from a mixture of public and private law, to 
law of an exclusively public nature. A similar shift from a 
mixed system to an exclusively public system took place on 
the continent. As English criminal law became more public, 
victims lost some discretion once they initiated a 
prosecution, but still retained an important role in the 
process through the unique English system of “private” 
prosecution.25 
Although private prosecutions have been significantly restrained, 
victims in England still retain a right to initiate criminal 
proceedings against their accused offenders.26 
In the American colonial period, private prosecutions were 
common. Scholars, however, debate their precise prevalence in our 
early history. Steven Twist, for example, asserts that “[p]rivate 
prosecutions, whereby the victim or the victim’s relatives or 
friends brought and prosecuted criminal charges against the 
accused wrongdoer, were the norm in the American justice system 
                                                          
22 Henderson, supra note 17, at 938-39. 
23 See id. at 938-39 (citing several sources). 
24 Id. at 939. 
25 Id. at 940-41. 
26 Twist, supra note 7, at 371. 
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at the time of the colonial revolution and the drafting of the 
Constitution.”27 In contrast, Rachel King asserts that “prosecuting 
criminals was in some sense always seen as a public duty, due to 
the greater egalitarianism of American society and to the fact that 
God, not just the people, demanded that the State handle this 
duty.”28 According to Lawrence Friedman, “[t]he public 
prosecutor—a government officer in charge of prosecution—
appeared quite early on this side of the Atlantic.”29 Although it is 
not clear whether public or private prosecutions predominated 
during the colonial period, it is evident that “criminal law was a 
combination of both public and private prosecution.”30 Private 
prosecutions continued in many states without significant scrutiny 
throughout the nineteenth century and still continue to this day in 
three states.31 In several other states, victims can hire their own 
attorneys to assist the prosecutor so long as control over the 
prosecution remains with the State.32 For the most part, however, 
the victim has been marginalized in criminal cases. 
Shifts from private to public administration of criminal justice 
became common as countries developed their bureaucratic 
capabilities.33 This trend is typically justified on several grounds. 
First, scholars note the prevalence of inaccurate accusations and 
excessive victim vengeance in private prosecutions.34 A victim 
                                                          
27 Id. at 370-71. 
28 King, supra note 12, at 366-67. 
29 Lawrence M. Friedman, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
29-30 (1993). 
30 King, supra note 12, at 367. 
31 Bessler, supra note 2, at 518-21 (noting that Alabama, Montana, and 
Ohio retain private prosecutions). 
32 Id. at 529. 
33 See generally David D. Friedman, Making Sense of English Law 
Enforcement in the Eighteenth Century, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 475 
(1995) (discussing the English trend toward public prosecution); Vik Kanwar, 
Capital Punishment as ‘Closure’: The Limits of a Victim-Centered 
Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 224 (2001-2002). 
34 See Aya Grueber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal 
Defense Based on Wrongful Victim Behaviors in An Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 
TEMP. L. REV. 645, 654 (2003) (discussing this viewpoint); John D. Bessler, The 
Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. 
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who seeks “an eye for an eye” from an innocent accused can spark 
a feud that ravages a community.35 Even when the accused is, in 
fact, the perpetrator, some victims will demand two eyes for an 
eye, creating the same possibility of extensive feuding.36 
Presumably, community stability, general peacekeeping, and 
proportional punishment for defendants are all enhanced when the 
State exercises monopoly power over vengeance. 
The problems with privately-sponsored criminal law 
enforcement tend to grow with the size of the criminal code. For 
one thing, when legislatures begin to criminalize conduct that is 
considered “victimless,” private enforcement of “victimless” 
crimes is likely to lead either to underenforcement or standing 
problems.37 As a consequence, much of this conduct is more 
efficiently deterred by placing prosecution in the hands of the 
State. Moreover, as criminal law has expanded to cover behaviors 
such as theft, fraud, and negligent homicide, the line between 
criminal conduct and socially useful behavior has become hazier.38 
Simple breach of contract is now hard to distinguish from theft, 
and modest mistakes in daily life look like manslaughter.39 Public 
prosecutors are not always ideally situated to perfectly judge which 
harms should be prosecuted as crimes, but they are very often more 
neutral and emotionally detached in exercising their discretion than 
                                                          
REV. 511 (1994). 
35 For a discussion of blood feuds and attempts by Germanic law to 
discourage them, see James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed 
a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U.L. REV. 29, 53-55 (1996). 
36 Id. 
37 Wayne A. Logan, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of 
Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1695, 1739 n. 244 (discussing 
standing problems associated with the private prosecution of victimless crimes). 
38 See Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741 
(1993) (discussing the role of mens rea in sorting socially useful activities from 
criminal activities). 
39 This issue might have contributed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s 
determination that private prosecution is invalid. In Biemel v. State, 37 N.W. 244 
(Wis. 1888), two members of a sailor’s union boarded a ship and attempted to 
eject the defendant, who was viewed to be working against the union’s interest. 
The defendant ended up shooting and killing one of the union members, so the 
union hired an attorney to prosecute the case. Id. 
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are victims.40 
The second difficulty with private enforcement of criminal law 
is that some victims are too forgiving. When a perpetrator preys on 
a member of the community and is not punished for the wrong, 
others in the community are at greater risk of being victimized by 
the perpetrator.41 Punishing the wrongdoer takes both time and 
effort, however, and not all victims can be counted on to make the 
requisite investment. Historically, when criminal law enforcement 
was nothing more than vigilante justice, the community, for its 
own protection, reserved for itself the authority to punish 
offenders.42 Public prosecutions, the legal counterpart of this social 
development, serve a similar function. 
In addition to time and effort, effective private prosecution also 
requires resources. Under a system of purely private prosecution, 
therefore, a perpetrator was much more likely to be punished when 
he harmed a rich person than when he victimized the poor.43 
Without public prosecution, the poor were disproportionately 
victimized relative to the rich.44 This disparity unfortunately 
persists under a system of public prosecution, but it is likely less 
magnified than it would be in a system based on private 
prosecution. Public prosecution thus enables a society to strive 
toward the provision of equal justice for all. 
To summarize, public enforcement of the criminal law can (1) 
contribute to the provision of equal access to justice; (2) increase 
the accuracy of verdicts; (3) help to more effectively separate 
criminal from noncriminal conduct; and (4) help to ensure that the 
guilty are punished while tempering the potential excesses of 
                                                          
40 Prosecutors presumably also are better able to objectively determine 
whether the excuse and justification defenses appropriately apply. 
41 In some cases, public prosecution is intended to protect the forgiving 
victim rather than the public at large. Domestic violence cases can fall into this 
category. See Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers 
and Negligent Doctors Might Have in Common, 49 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 
(2004). 
42 Henderson, supra note 17, at 939 & n.7. 
43 Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action, 
11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 130 (1984). 
44 Cf. Friedman, supra note 33 at 490. 
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victim desires for revenge. To serve these goals, victim 
involvement in criminal trials has diminished over time, as the 
State has become the predominant enforcement agent. 
II. THE POLITICAL INEVITABILITY OF VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Although the shift from private to public prosecution serves 
important public policy goals, the pendulum has swung too far 
away from the victim. As a matter of rhetoric, first-year law 
students are often told that crimes are wrongs committed against 
the State rather than against the individual. As a matter of practice, 
victims are often completely sidelined in the criminal process. 
Many victims never have an opportunity to meet with the 
prosecutors in their cases and those who do very often report that 
they do not feel as though their concerns were taken into account.45 
The vast majority of criminal cases end with plea agreements,46 
and yet victims often are not informed that their cases have been 
resolved.47 Victim notice is similarly lacking with regard to bond 
releases and parole grants.48 Until recent advocacy efforts enabled 
the submission of victim impact statements, many victims were 
denied the opportunity to speak to the court about either the extent 
of their suffering or their views about the appropriate punishment 
                                                          
45 David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It 
Belongs, Then Why Is It So Hard To Find?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1663, 1670 
(2000). This problem may depend on the location of the crime, and many law 
enforcement personnel believe that they do, in fact, take victim concerns into 
account. See generally Donald J. Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution 
and Disposition of a Criminal Case, 28 VAND. L. REV. 931 (1975) (reporting 
that interviewed Nashville, Tennessee law enforcement personnel stated that 
they believed they took victims’ concerns and desires into account). 
46 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L. J. 1909, 1909 n.1 (1992). 
47 PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 39 
(2001). 
48 Hearing on H.J. Res. 64, supra note 1, at 20 (statement of Rep. Steve 
Chabot) (stating that “a study by the National Institute of Justice found that only 
60 percent of victims are notified when defendants are sentenced and only 40 
percent are notified of a defendant’s pretrial release”). 
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of the offenders.49 To date, some victims and their family members 
are subpoenaed by defense counsel as potential witnesses and, 
therefore, are barred from even attending the trials in their cases.50 
Further, trials are often delayed repeatedly, causing victims 
increasing anxiety.51 
Many prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law professors would 
challenge the assertion that the pendulum has swung too far. 
Prosecutors would likely claim that they are already sadly 
overburdened with preparing cases for court.52 After all, they are 
not trained to be counselors and are less able to do their jobs 
effectively if they have to spend time holding victims’ hands. 
Defense attorneys no doubt worry that victim attendance and 
participation at criminal trials would force each of their clients to 
defend himself against not one but two adversaries. Notably, the 
recent political clamor for victims’ rights is often driven by various 
law enforcement personnel, who have formed formidable interest 
groups in Congress and the state legislatures.53 Thus, to the extent 
that the State hides in the clothing of the victim, its claims of 
unfairness are suspicious and unavailing. Finally, law professors 
might make the mistake of concluding that victim absence from 
criminal procedure textbooks indicates that victims do not deserve 
a place in the criminal process. As a consequence, most law 
                                                          
49 See Rachelle K. Houp, Nothing to Fear: Establishing an Equality of 
Rights for Crime Victims Through The Victims’ Rights Amendment, 16 NOTRE 
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 207, 237 n.48 (2002). 
50 See, e.g., Hearing on H.J. Res. 91, supra note 6, at 50 (prepared 
statement of Steven J. Twist) (discussing proposed right to presence and 
providing an example of a victim’s family’s strategic exclusion from the 
courtroom). 
51 Id. at 59-61 (discussing the proposed amendment’s recognition of 
victims’ interest in avoiding unreasonable delay and providing examples of 
occasions in which victims’ interests have been ignored). 
52 See M. Elaine Nugent & Mark L. Miller, Basic Factors in Determining 
Prosecutor Workload, 36 THE PROSECUTOR 32, 33 (Jul.-Aug. 2002) (noting that 
prosecutors’ workloads have increased due to victims’ rights legislation). 
53 Examples of law enforcement advocacy groups in the United States 
include the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, the National Troopers 
Coalition, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National District 
Attorneys Association, and the Prosecutor Bar Association, among many others. 
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professors are heavily biased toward the maintenance of the status 
quo. Myriad arguments have been advanced to discredit victim 
involvement in the criminal context.54 Notice to victims is 
expensive. Victim involvement at trial is unfair to defendants and 
can undermine prosecutorial efforts. Victim witness attendance can 
lead to false convictions. Impact statements are simply 
prosecutorial ploys to enhance sentences. Restricted trial 
continuances hurt both the prosecutor’s and the defense’s case. 
Some “victims” are actually in collusion with defendants to try to 
prevent conviction. 
Many of these arguments have considerable merit. Others 
make sense in the abstract, but do not seem to be supported by 
negative effects in actual trials. For example, studies of victim 
impact statements indicate that the statements have little or no 
effect on sentencing, although they seem to contribute significantly 
to victim satisfaction in the resolution of the cases.55 On the other 
hand, many proposals would likely prove quite harmful. Tinkering 
with the criminal process can threaten the due process rights of the 
defendant, and broadly-worded state and proposed federal 
constitutional amendments can significantly alter the balance of 
forces at criminal trials in unintended and potentially deleterious 
ways.56 Very careful consideration should be given to any victims’ 
rights proposal. 
Despite our concerns and preferences for the current balance, 
however, victims will, as a matter of political reality, find a way to 
swing the pendulum back in the direction of their participation at 
trial. Thirty-two states have already passed constitutional 
amendments guaranteeing victims’ rights,57 and others have 
provided similar rights with statutes.58 Moreover, Congress has 
been quick to consider similar changes to the United States Code 
                                                          
54 See authorities cited in supra footnotes 2-5. 
55 Hearing on H.J. Res. 91, supra note 6, at 55 (prepared statement of 
Steven J. Twist) (citing studies). 
56 See Victims’ Rights, supra note 5, at 1691. 
57 The texts of the state constitutional amendments have been reproduced at 
Hearing on H.J. Res. 64, supra note 1, at 154-202. 
58 Robert P. Mosteller & H. Jefferson Powell, With Disdain for the 
Constitutional Craft, 78 N.C. L. REV. 371, 374-75 (2000). 
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and the federal Constitution.59 This trend in the direction of victim 
involvement will no doubt continue. 
The recent and ongoing success of the victims’ rights 
movement can be attributed to the “Baptists and Bootleggers” form 
of the interest groups that are collaborating to advocate the 
reforms. The classic “Baptists and Bootleggers” coalition is one 
“in which do-gooders and special interests combine forces to 
endorse legislation (such as Prohibition) that the ‘Baptists’ believe 
to be morally worthy and the ‘Bootleggers’ believe will benefit 
them economically.”60 The two groups together can achieve 
legislative reforms that often neither can achieve alone.61 The 
“Bootleggers” need a public interest face to make their reforms 
seem more popular, and the “Baptists” need a group with a 
significant personal stake in the outcome to relentlessly finance or 
otherwise help to push through the legislation.62 
The proposals to include victim participation in the criminal 
process are sponsored and supported by two different groups. The 
“Bootleggers” of the victims’ rights movement are organizations 
representing the police and prosecutors, whose jobs are hindered 
by defendants’ procedural guarantees.63 They can be viewed as 
“Bootleggers” not because the individual members of the 
organizations stand to gain financially from the passage of criminal 
procedure reforms, but rather because these groups are viewed 
with suspicion when they stand alone to push reforms. After all, 
                                                          
59 Id. 
60 David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1960, 1986 n.133 (2003) (review essay); see also Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists? 
The Political Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. L. REV. 
315 (2002). 
61 Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory 
Economist, REGULATION MAY/JUNE 1983, at 13-14 (describing the Baptist, 
Bootlegger Theory of Regulation). 
62 Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists and the Global 
Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188 (2002). 
63 Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights 
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 582 (1998) (“[M]any of the proposals 
and victims’ rights amendments to state constitutions had less to do with the real 
concerns and needs of victims of violent crime than with law enforcement and 
crime control concerns.”). 
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defendants’ procedural protections exist because of the potential 
for state powers to become oppressive. Thus, state employees are 
hardly effective symbols of the need for procedural reform. 
The victims, on the other hand, serve as the “Baptists” of the 
victims’ rights movement. Victims of violent crimes perpetrated by 
strangers are the most effective spokespeople for the movement 
because they remind us of our own vulnerability to predation. They 
have suffered tremendous hardship and have turned their grief into 
an effort to help prevent others from suffering their fates. Their 
tales of neglect and abuse in the criminal justice process serve to 
powerfully illustrate the weaknesses of a system that has 
marginalized them and, as a consequence, magnified their 
suffering. 
Why should marginalization cause extra harm to victims? 
Deeply embedded in our human psyche is an instinct to act 
retributively when others harm us in a way that threatens our status 
in our social communities.64 The desire for retribution is an 
effective tool for discouraging others from taking advantage of us. 
There may be a role for forgiving others, but forgiveness, if 
conferred routinely and automatically, invites future predation.65 
From an evolutionary perspective, victimization might also have 
been a signal that the person did not enjoy the respect and support 
of community members.66 Humans have never thrived in 
isolation.67 Instead, they live in groups for several reasons, 
including the fact that loyal group members enhance personal 
                                                          
64 See JACOBY, supra 8, at 152 (“It was taken for granted that humans had a 
deep need—a need as sharp as hunger or sexual desire—to avenge their injuries, 
to restore a sense of equity when they felt their integrity had been violated.”). 
65 See Erin O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1178 (2002) (stating that victims who forgive too easily 
may be seen as “chumps” or “pushovers”). 
66 Relatedly, income and risk of victimization are negatively correlated, 
suggesting that, even today, those who enjoy higher social status are less likely 
to be victimized. John H. Laub, Patterns of Criminal Victimization in the United 
States, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 9, 15-16 (Sage Publications 1997) (interpreting 
National Crime Victimization Survey data as demonstrating that income is 
negatively and proportionally related to risk of personal victimization). 
67 PAUL H. RUBIN, DARWINIAN POLITICS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF 
FREEDOM 4, 7 (2002). 
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security.68 An individual who received little respect in her 
community during an era without an effective public criminal 
justice system was presumably less likely to garner private support 
in her efforts to retaliate and, therefore, more vulnerable to being 
victimized. 
When the State monopolizes retributive efforts, victims feel 
anxious for two distinct reasons. First, an unsuccessful trial or poor 
treatment by the State’s representatives can cause the victim to 
believe that she lacks the support of her community.69 Second, her 
feelings of disempowerment are exacerbated by the fact that she is 
disenabled from taking retribution into her own hands. 
Victims, therefore, often seek three types of reforms in an 
effort to satisfy their status and vulnerability concerns: (1) reforms 
designed to make conviction easier; (2) reforms designed to ensure 
victims better treatment in the criminal justice process; and (3) 
reforms designed to ensure victims active participation in the 
criminal proceedings.70 Experts on the psychological effects of 
crime have emphasized the importance to victims of this last set of 
reforms by noting that “failure to offer victims a chance to 
participate in criminal proceedings can ‘result in increased feelings 
of inequity on the part of victims, with a corresponding increase in 
crime-related psychological harm.’” At the same time, “there is 
mounting evidence that ‘having a voice may improve victims’ 
mental condition and welfare.’ For some victims, making a 
statement helps restore balance between themselves and the 
offenders.”71 
With respect to some of these reforms, the interests of the 
“Baptists” and “Bootleggers” begin to diverge. Law enforcement 
personnel obviously are interested in increased convictions, but it 
seems plausible that they may be decidedly ambivalent about 
                                                          
68 Id. at 38 (“One of the major benefits of group living is the ability to 
minimize predation.”). 
69 Indeed, one of the primary reasons that victims often fail to report crimes 
is their fear about how they will be treated and whether they will be believed. 
Deborah P. Kelly & Edna Erez, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice 
System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 231, 232-33 (Sage Publications 1997). 
70 See generally Hearing on H.J. Res. 91, supra note 6, at 28-69. 
71 Id. at 57 (prepared statement of Steven J. Twist) (citing experts). 
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victim participation rights. Active participation by victims can 
threaten the discretion and authority of the State, and victim 
presence at proceedings can expose prosecutor strategies and 
behaviors that law enforcement might prefer to keep hidden.72 
For those who are sympathetic to the needs of victims yet 
suspicious of state agents’ efforts to retain and increase their 
powers at the expense of defendants, it seems worthwhile to give 
some thought to whether the “Baptists” really need the 
“Bootleggers” to obtain reforms. 
Twenty-five years ago, victim advocacy groups were weak and 
unfunded, victims were just beginning to organize, and law 
enforcement groups already were well-organized, effective 
lobbying groups. In those days, the “Baptists” relied heavily on the 
“Bootleggers” to help them try to reform the system. In fact, some 
claim that the victims’ rights movement was co-opted by law 
enforcement.73 
Today, however, victims’ rights groups are better organized 
and better funded—thanks in part to their success in obtaining 
government funding through legislative reforms and grant 
offerings.74 Several national organizations have achieved 
prominence, including The National Center for Victims of Crime75 
                                                          
72 See, e.g., Ronald Goldstock et al., Justice That Makes Sense, 32 THE 
PROSECUTOR 28, 31 (Feb. 1998) (President of the National District Attorneys 
Association stating opposition to victims’ rights proposals that would interfere 
with prosecutorial discretion); Kelly & Erez, supra note 69, at 233 (“Prosecutors 
are particularly likely to resist consideration of the victims’ point of view 
because it is prosecutors’ control that would be most eroded.”). 
73 See, e.g., Robert Elias, Which Victim Movement? The Politics of Victim 
Policy in VICTIMS OF CRIME: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 229-47 
(Arthur J. Lurigio, et al. eds., 1990); Mosteller, Victims’ Rights, supra note 5; 
Henderson, supra note 17, at 951. 
74 See, e.g., National Center for Victims of Crimes, at 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbID=DB_About 189 (noting support 
from government grants); Parents of Murdered Children, Inc., at 
http://www.pomc.com/history.cfm (same); Office for Victims of Crime, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/2005NCVRWfund/welcome.html (grant 
opportunity offered by the Office for Victims of Crime). 
75 The National Center website states that the organization has worked with 
more than 10,000 grassroots organizations and has assisted millions of crime 
victims. See http://www.ncvc.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). 
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and several co-supporters of the Victims’ Rights Amendment, 
including Parents of Murdered Children, The National 
Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA),76 Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD), the Stephanie Roper Foundation, 
Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Crime Victims United, and 
Memory of Victims Everywhere. These organizations, along with 
state and regional organizations, train volunteers and professionals, 
and achieve legislative and constitutional reforms. Especially given 
the popularity of recent victims’ rights reform efforts,77 victims’ 
groups may be capable of obtaining (at least statutory) reforms on 
their own, whether or not these reforms coincide with the interests 
of law enforcement. 
Whether victims’ rights organizations can obtain reforms 
independently is significant because there may be reforms that will 
address victims’ concerns without increasing the problems 
associated with state authority in the criminal process. Of the three 
types of reforms mentioned above—victim participation, victim 
treatment, and enhanced convictions—only the third inevitably 
leads to increased state authority. These reforms are probably the 
easiest to achieve statutorily because the “Baptists” and 
“Bootleggers” can work together; however, presumably they are 
also the most likely to be struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The recent unsuccessful effort to undo the exclusionary rule 
provides an instructive example of such an attempt.78 
Victim treatment and participation rights, on the other hand, 
could address legitimate victim concerns without upsetting the 
balance between the defendant and the State. Moreover, these 
rights might enable victims to more effectively monitor 
                                                          
76 NOVA’s listed mission, purposes, and accomplishments make clear its 
broad influence in the areas of victim assistance and victims’ right reforms. See 
National Organization for Victim Assistance, at http://www.trynova.org/about/ 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005). 
77 See Hearing on H.J. Res. 64, supra note 1, at 45 (statement of Hon. 
Robert C. Scott, A Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia) 
(“[T]he polls demonstrate the power that victims have in 60, 70, 80, 90 percent 
passage of constitutional amendments. Whether they diminish the rights of 
defendants or not, they are very popular. The victims have the political power.”). 
78 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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prosecutorial conduct. Of course, proposed reforms in these 
categories could also undermine criminal justice. Examples of such 
questionable reforms include proposals to enable victims to veto 
plea agreements or to oppose continuances, which might force 
parties to proceed to trial before they are ready.79 Others, however, 
are more benign, such as the right of victims to notice and 
attendance, and the right to speak at release and sentencing 
proceedings.80 
CONCLUSION 
This essay leaves for another day a more detailed exploration 
of possible reforms. It argues, however, that law professors may 
make matters worse when they wholesale reject victims’ rights 
efforts as destructive of established principles of justice. Victims’ 
rights advocates are not likely to disappear in the near future; 
indeed, their influence is growing and their message powerful. 
Consequently, commentators in the field of criminal justice must 
work carefully to craft reforms that serve victims without aiding 
the State in amassing boundless power or in eroding protections for 
defendants. Oddly enough, as victims’ rights groups gain strength, 
they become better able to obtain reforms that contribute to their 
emotional wellbeing without affecting the balance between the 
official adversaries in the criminal process. Rather than resisting 
victims by accusing them of “irrationality” or “brutality,” scholars 
and advocates should focus on finding ways to separate the 
“Baptists” from the “Bootleggers.” 
 
 
                                                          
79 Kelly & Erez, supra note 69, at 234 (“No state gives victims a veto over 
plea bargains.”); Henderson, supra note 17, at 974-76 (opposing a proposal that 
would allow victims to oppose continuances). 
80 Kelly & Erez, supra note 69, at 233-34 (summarizing the adoption of 
such participatory reforms). 
